![]() |
An Evolutionary Theory of Personality |
![]()
Most theories of the personality disorders have been developed within a particular perspective, be it psychodynamic, cognitive, behavioral, or interpersonal, or biophysical. Such theories are incongruent with the nature of personality itself, which concerns the patterning of variables across the entire matrix of the person. To be commensurate with the construct of personality, a theory must be based on principles which span, or transcend, these multiple domains. Other approaches confuse part and whole. The principles of evolution serve this function, and integrate the various domains of personality.
Philosophers of science agree that it is theory which provides the conceptual glue that binds a nosology together. Moreover, a good theory not only summarizes and incorporates extant knowledge, it possesses systematic import, in that it originates and develops new observations and new methods. A taxonomy must "carve nature at its joints," so to speak. The philosopher of science Carl Hempel (1965) clearly distinguished between natural and artificial classification systems: "Distinctions between 'natural' and 'artificial' classifications may well be explicated as referring to the difference between classifications that are scientifically fruitful and those that are not: In a classification of the former kind, those characteristics of the elements which serve as criteria of membership in a given class are associated, universally or with high-probability, with more or less extensive clusters of other characteristics. ...a classification of this sort should be viewed as somehow having objective existence in nature, as 'carving nature at the joints'... (Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 1965, pp. 146-147).
The biological sexes, male and female, and the periodic table of elements are both examples of classifications schemes which can be viewed as possessing "objective" existence in nature. The items psychologists seek to classify are not genders or chemical elements, however, but persons. In so doing, we seek the ideal of a classification scheme which is "natural," one which "inheres" in the subject domain, not "imposed" on it by committee consensus or statistical methodology. Such a system would be not only be sufficient with respect to the phenomena of a subject domain, but also logically necessary. To achieve such an end, the systems of kinds which undergirds any domain of inquiry must itself be answerable to the question that forms the very point of departure for the scientific enterprise: Why does nature take this particular form rather than some other? Theory and taxonomy are thus intimately intertwined.
THE POLARITY MODEL OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS
The theoretical model which follows is grounded in evolutionary theory. In essence, it seeks to explicate the structure and styles of personality with reference to deficient, imbalanced, or conflicted modes of ecological adaptation and reproductive strategy. The proposition that the development and functions of personologic traits may be usefully explored through the lens of evolutionary principles has a long, if yet unfulfilled tradition. Spencer (1870) and Huxley (1870) offered suggestions of this nature shortly after Darwin's seminal Origins was published. In more recent times, we have seen the emergence of sociobiology, an interdisciplinary science that explores the interface between human social functioning and evolutionary biology (Wilson, 1975, 1978).
Four domains or spheres in which evolutionary principles are demonstrated are labeled Existence, Adaptation, Replication, and Abstraction. The first relates the serendipitous transformation of random or less organized states into those possessing distinct structures of greater organization; the second refers to homeostatic processes employed to sustain survival in open ecosystems; the third pertains to reproductive styles that maximize the diversification and selection of ecologically effective attributes; and the fourth concerns the emergence of competencies that foster anticipatory planning and reasoned decision-making. Polarities from the first three phases are used to construct a theoretically-embedded classification system of personality disorders, providing content for the first of two levels at which the theory is operationalized, the second being the specification of functional-structural domains for each derived construct.
The first phase, existence, concerns the maintenance of integrative phenomena, whether nuclear particle, virus, or human being, against the background of entropic decompensation. Evolutionary mechanisms derived from this stage regard life-enhancement and life-preservation. The former are concerned with orienting individuals toward improvement in the quality of life; the latter with orienting individuals away from actions or environments that decrease the quality of life, or even jeopardize existence itself. These may be called existential aims. At the highest level of abstraction such mechanisms form, phenomenologically or metaphorically expressed, a pleasure-pain polarity. Some individuals are conflicted in regard to these existential aims (for example, the sadistic), while other possess deficits in these crucial substrates (for example, the schizoid).
Existence, however, is but an initial phase. Once an integrative structure exists, it must maintain its existence through exchanges of energy and information with its environment. The second evolutionary stage relates to what is termed the modes of adaptation; it is also framed as a two-part polarity, a passive orientation, a tendency to accommodate to one's ecological niche, versus an active orientation, a tendency to modify or intervene in one's surrounds. These modes of adaptation differ from the first phase of evolution, in that they regard how that which exists now endures.
Although organisms may exist well-adapted to their environments, the existence of any life-form is time-limited. To circumvent this limitation, organisms have developed strategies by which to leave progeny. These strategies regard what biologists have referred to as an r- or self-propagating strategy at one polar extreme, and a K- or other-nurturing strategy at the second extreme. Psychologically, the former strategy is disposed toward actions which are egotistic, insensitive, inconsiderate, and uncaring; while the latter is disposed toward actions which are affiliative, intimate, protective, and solicitous.
A Derivation of the DSM Personality Disorders
Some personalities exhibit a reasonable balance on one or other of the polarity pairs. Not all individuals fall at the center, of course. Individual differences in both personality features and overall style will reflect the relative positions and strengths of each polarity component. Personalities we have termed deficient lack the capacity to experience or to enact certain aspects of the three polarities (e. g., the schizoid has a faulty substrate for both "pleasure" and "pain"); those spoken of as imbalanced lean strongly toward one or another extreme of a polarity (e. g., the dependent is oriented almost exclusively to receiving the support and nurturance of "others"); and those we judge conflicted struggle with ambivalences toward opposing ends of a bipolarity (e. g., the passive-aggressive vacillates between adhering to the expectancies of "others" versus enacting what is wished for one's "self').

Personalities termed pleasure-deficient lack the capacity to experience or to enact certain aspects of the three polarities. The interpersonally-imbalanced lean strongly toward one or another extreme of a polarity. Finally, the intrapsychically-conflicted struggle with ambivalences toward opposing ends of a bipolarity.
Three additional pathological personality patternsthe Schizotypal, Borderline, and Paranoidrepresent structurally-deficient personalities in the more advanced stages of pathology. Reflecting an insidious and slow deterioration of the personality structure, these differ from the basic personality disorders by several criteria, notably, deficits in social competence and frequent (but usually reversible) psychotic episodes. Less integrated in terms of personality organization and less effective in coping than their milder counterparts, they are especially vulnerable to the everyday strains of life.
![]() |
Text for this page has been abstracted from Toward a New Personology (1990). |